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Introduction
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may
be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This
Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may
strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground
that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the
due process clause has been held by the Court applicable
to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of
procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must
be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal
principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we
must let our minds be bold.'
This edition of the Roger Williams University Law Review is
dedicated to the important area of legal scholarship known as
narrative jurisprudence. The articles that follow are as diverse as
the term "narrative," and the related topic of the relationship
between law and storytelling, might imply.
Narrative describes a different way of looking at things. It
seeks to expose the existence of the dominant paradigm, and then
it seeks to topple it.
[It] embraces concreteness or contextualism and rejects
formalism and universalism. Thus, rules in and of
themselves do not dictate outcomes. Instead, rules
informed by reason-practical reason learned through
303
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
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experience-create expertise. This new form of
scholarship decries the use of analytic reasoning,
reasoning not guided by practice or experience, as second-
best.2
The legal field is an insular one. With its own set of rules,
both of conduct and of language, the legal profession lies
particularly prey to the seductive path of the status quo. It has
been done this way for so long that there appears no great reason
to change things. For this reason, there is a great lack of
introspection. There is also a tendency to fail to make observations
outside the confines of the law, to look at the causes and effects of
decisions, of arguments, of the rules that make up the great and
venerable legal cannon. And so we remain an island.
But we should not remain an island; the importance of
narrative is in its ability to coax us off of it. The American legal
profession affects the lives of every single person living in the
United States every single day. When one becomes a lawyer, one
takes an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States of
America, and that of the state in which one takes the bar. The
oath also contains the following: "I will never reject, from any
consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless, or
oppressed, or delay anyone's cause for lucre or malice. . ." In order
to uphold that oath, a lawyer must be able to identify the cause of
the defenseless, or oppressed; this task is impossible if the lawyer
never looks inside to see what motivates him or her, and never
looks outside the profession to gain perspective on the hopes,
dreams, fears, and histories of those with whom we share space in
this country.
That said, it seems appropriate to spend just a moment
talking about our perspective. Roger Williams University School of
Law is the only law school in Rhode Island. Roger Williams, the
founder of our state and our law school's namesake, called our
state a "lively experiment" in religious liberty, in tolerance and in
freedom. Legal narrative also represents a new and lively
experiment in the field of law and this Law Review is glad to be
part of that experiment with this edition. Richard Delgado, one of
2. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving
Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in
Legal Scholarship, 79 IowA L. REV. 803, 813 (1994).
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the leading thinkers in this area, who has written extensively and
movingly about the importance of narrative3, sums up our
perspective perfectly:
Telling stories invests texts with feeling, gives voice to
those who were taught to hide their emotions. Hearing
stories invites hearers to participate, challenging their
assumptions, jarring their complacency, lifting their
spirits, lowering their defenses. Stories are useful tools
for the underdog because they invite the listener to
suspend judgment, listen for the story's point, and test it
against his or her own version of reality. This process is
essential in a pluralist society like ours, and it is a
practical necessity for underdogs. All movements for
change must gain the support, or at least the
understanding, of the dominant group...4
This edition of the Law Review is split into three distinct
sections. The first section includes a selection of articles that
employ, in one way or another, the narrative method. These
articles explore the relationship between law and storytelling,
whether these stories come from poems or the tales of Harry
Potter. The second section of the edition is comprised of articles
written by individuals who gathered at Roger Williams University
School of Law in the Fall of 2005 to participate in another lively
experiment: A Symposium on Sentencing Rhetoric: Competing
Narratives Post-Booker. The third section includes sentencing
transcripts by judges who participated in the symposium. These
transcripts illuminate how judges wrangle with the different
stories, or narratives, offered by the various "players" at a
criminal sentencing.
3. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) [hereinafter
Delgado, Plea for Narrative]; Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School:
A Reply to Farber & Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993) [hereinafter
Delgado, Reply]; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chronicle: Cultural Power,
the Law Reviews, and the Attack on Narrative Jurisprudence, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 545 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chronicle]; Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious
Moral Error?, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1929 (1991), Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Imposition, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025 (1994).
4. Delgado, Plea for Narrative, supra note 3, at 440.
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Each in their own unique way, the articles in the first part of
the edition deal critically and fully with the issue of perspective,
and each provides an alternative way of looking at the status quo,
a counterstory to the legal majoritarian tale in a given context. 5
Stephanie Weinstein's piece examines race, a context familiar to
legal narrative, but applies its lessons to a modern context - the
post 9/11 world and the war on terrorism.6 In so doing, Weinstein
explores the darker side of audience, and the pragmatic side of
speaking to that audience. Arthur Wolfson contributes a
thoughtful book review that examines narrative as a device for
thinking about the law, and suggests that it may be used in new
and yet to be exploited ways. 7 Wolfson examines, in his analysis of
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic's new book, the way in which
the story of being a lawyer has become ingrained and stale, and
details ways in which creative narrative breath may be breathed
into the profession itself. Both Wolfson and Weinstein were
students of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic at the University
of Pittsburgh Law School, and bring a rich and varied perspective
to this edition of the Law Review.
Professors Edward Eberle and Bernhard Grossfeld contribute
a piece that gets to the very heart of what narrative is all about -
language. Within the American legal profession, lawyers use
words to achieve desired outcomes, weaving them through facts
and precedent, history and exhortation. Words are the tools of the
trade, and without them, truly, we are nothing. But do the words
used in courtrooms or in legal briefs rise to the level of poetry?
So, the question is: what about the relationship of law
and poetry? Does poetry inform law? Does law inform
poetry? These questions are worth asking and pursuing
because we as lawyers know that there is a range of
phenomena and forces that influences and drives a
culture on which law sits. The words (or ABCs) of law are
5. Arthur M. Wolfson, The Lessons of Narrative: A Review of How
Lawyers Lose Their Way: A Profession Fails its Creative Minds by Jean
Stefancic and Richard Delgado, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 431, 434-36
(2006).
6. Stephanie Weinstein, A Needed Image Makeover: Interest
Convergence and the United States' War on Terror, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 403 (2006).
7. See generally Wolfson, supra note 5.
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just the bare statements of ideas or rules that, like the
skin of a piece of fruit, gain real meaning only from
interaction with the culture in which they operate. In
this respect, we might think of law, especially its words,
as the software which can function effectively only within
the operating system of a culture.8
Words may be the bread and butter of a lawyer, but it is only
in how they are heard that dreams are realized. We can use all of
the words in the world, but without dedicated attention to the ears
of our audience, and serious thought into why people hear things
in such different ways, the best argument will fall on deaf ears.
Aaron Schwabach provides a fascinating look at the stories
that we are telling the next generation of legal thinkers in the
United States by examining the rule of law as portrayed in the
popular series of books about the trials and tribulations of a
certain Harry Potter. In so doing, Professor Schwabach adds to
the "them" of audience, and proffers some ideas on what the next
generation is, in fact, hearing when it listens to our stories.
Indeed, by telling these stories, we tell many underlying stories.
The law of Harry's world is important to our world for at
least two reasons. First, Harry's world provides an
entirely constructed universe, a laboratory in which legal
thought-experiments can be conducted without real-world
consequences. Second, literature shapes law: For every
real-life model of advocacy, adjudicative, and rule-making
roles that the average first-year law student has, there
are a hundred fictional models, from Atticus Finch to,
well, Albus Dumbledore. The readers of Harry Potter will
internalize its portrayals, particularly the uncertain
quality of justice in a lawyerless society, and someday
bring them to the practice of law.9
These four articles all present us with clear and convincing
evidence of the existence of competing narratives in our world.
They exhort us to step out of the confines of the story we have
8. Edward Eberle & Bernhard Grossfeld, Law and Poetry, 11 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 353, 354 (2006).
9. Aaron Schwabach, Harry Potter and the Unforgivable Curses: Norm-
formation, Inconsistency, and the Rule of Law in the Wizarding World, 11
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 309, 310-11 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
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always been told. They encourage us to examine our own stories,
to examine where that has brought us, and where it should bring
us in the future.
In the second portion of the edition, those participants who
generously contributed their time, their voices and their
perspectives to a unique examination of the vitally important topic
of criminal sentencing contribute their written work. Professor Ian
Weinstein, in relaying his own history and perspective to the
reader as a backdrop against which to understand his point of
view said this:
I sought every chink and groove in the seemingly smooth
edifice of the Guidelines and asked every judge in front of
whom I appeared to release a bit of the now dammed up
waters of discretion to bathe each of my clients in the cool
waters of mitigation. Many were happy to release a
trickle and often, at least in the beginning, we splashed
around a good deal at sentencing.'0
It seems to speak almost wistfully of a bygone era when the
conversation was robust and the lines of communication open. The
symposium was aimed, at least in part, at starting that
conversation up again, as is this edition as a whole." Indeed, we
all have historical roots, and we have perspectives and stories of
our own that we bring to any table at which we sit. This edition is
a small contribution to the growing body of scholarship that
recognizes, and in fact celebrates, this important shift away from
the mentality of the island that has for far too long plagued the
legal profession.
Bridget Longridge*
10. Ian Weinstein, The Historical Roots of Sentencing Variation 11
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 495, 496 (2006).
11. Please see the introduction to the symposium written by Professor
David Zlotnick for some real insight into the experience of attending the
symposium, and to get a sense of just how important it was to gather these
voices together. David Zlotnick, Symposium on Sentencing Rhetoric:
Competing Narratives in the Post-Booker Era, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
449 (2006). A lively experiment, indeed.
* Executive Articles Editor, Roger Williams University Law Review;
J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law (anticipated, 2006); B.A.,
Social Thought and Political Economy, University of Massachusetts at
Amherst (2001).
